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Abstract 
 
In this PhD by Published Work the author is advocating a right to security broadly grounded 
in ‘communitarian’ ideals. The ‘absolutist’ state theory of, say, Thomas Hobbes, to protect 
society from collapse, pays too little attention to genuine fears that the state can actually 
pose a threat to security; in giving the state significant powers of security, it can undermine 
the very values one is seeking to secure; and is there actual evidence that substantial gains 
in state power over the last fifteen years or so, since ‘9/11’, for example, have actually made 
nations more safe? But liberalism, at least the form suggested by, say, Ronald Dworkin, in 
being unprepared to accept a balance between rights and security, seemingly overlooks 
threats that undermine the very freedoms liberals like Dworkin wish to protect. And the 
liberal philosophy, at least its John Locke traditions, of absolute freedoms is too 
individualistic and attaches too little weight to responsibilities. Plotting a course, therefore, 
through these criticisms of state absolutism and liberalism one therefore ‘finds’ 
communitarianism as a philosophy to support a right to security. The author’s 
‘communitarian’, right to security is based on an expansive interpretation of ‘positive’ duties 
of the state, to protect, say, the rights to life of individuals from violations by non-state 
actors such as suspected terrorists. The author is therefore not proposing an autonomous 
right to security; he is developing an existing one. And as the author still sees his right to 
security as largely a justiciable one enforceable before the courts, his approach is a more 
moderate aspect of communitarianism embracing some liberal ideas of constitutionalism 
such as judicial review. 
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Human Rights, Positive Obligations and the Development of a Right to Security 
 
Introduction 
 
The title of this PhD by Published work is ‘Human Rights, ‘Positive’ Obligations and the 
Development of a Right to Security’. It was not the author’s intention from the publication 
of the first article in this study that he would undertake doctoral research, so of course each 
published work here is not the same as an individual chapter of a regular PhD. It would be 
drafted several times and then revised again once a draft thesis has been completed, to 
make the latter, say, more focused and cohesive. But as the author began to be published 
more in the fields of human rights and anti-terrorism, he noticed a theme developing: 
conceptual and policy issues and dilemmas concerning a ‘group’ ‘right to security’. So there 
is an underlying nexus between the articles presented in this study, the purpose of which 
this piece of work is to expressly articulate these in terms of an ‘overarching’ thesis. 
 
On the face of it, the author’s publications to date, which are all single-authored and 
featured in peer reviewed academic journals from 2008 to 2015, should satisfy the 
‘originality’ criterion of a PhD. They are a unique collection of case studies that draw on the 
‘law in action’1 and ‘social-legal’2 approaches to legal research (though not ignoring ‘black-
                                                 
1 See, for example, Michael Salter and Julie Mason, Writing Law Dissertations: An 
Introduction and Guide to the Conduct of Legal Research. Pearson Education Ltd, 2007, at 
pp.125-131.  
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letter’/doctrinal3 analyses in the process). That said, they also illustrate the significant utility 
and practical reach of ‘positive’ obligations imposed upon the state by, say, the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). These include: Article 2(1), the right to life; Article 3, 
the freedom from torture and inhuman and degrading punishment and treatment; and 
Article 4(1), the freedom from slavery and servitude. Ordinarily, human rights are defined as 
acting ‘negatively’, in that they reflect a traditional, liberal desire to restrain curtailments of 
individual freedom by the state; they are ‘freedoms from’ governmental intrusion. Article 3 
of the ECHR, for example, is the ‘freedom from’ torture. But, and this is rarely addressed 
within, say, liberal discourse, the right also acts ‘positively’, in that it obliges the state to 
prevent violations of the freedom by non-state actors such as suspected terrorists. The aim 
of this ‘overarching’ thesis is to marry the author’s published case studies on ‘positive’ 
obligations with the philosophies of, say, communitarianism, which supersede an apparent 
one-sided negative freedom from perspective upon rights, to supply a theoretical base to a 
‘group’ ‘right of security’. This concern with underlying theoretical underpinnings is 
currently lacking from the author’s academic writing, at least as an express topic in its own 
right. But before tackling this, the author will discuss the ‘right to security’ – or at least refer 
to its many possible interpretations. 
 
 
 
Explaining a right to security 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 Ibid., at pp.118-181. 
3 Ibid., at pp.44-118. 
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Surprisingly, explaining the nature of a right to security is elusive. Powell, for example, has 
expressed concern at the failure of human rights law to define exactly what the concept of 
security is: it is merely assumed that security is clearly understood and can be taken for 
granted.4 In simple terms, Hein van Kempen says that security is described as freedom from 
threat, danger, vulnerability, menace, force and attack.5 But the ‘rather basic nature of this 
definition’ should not disguise the fact that there are many different forms of security, and 
that the meaning of this conception is both developing and highly contested.6 Nonetheless, 
he says that human rights law presupposes four different concepts of security: ‘negative 
individual security against the state’; ‘international security’; ‘security as justification to limit 
human rights’; and ‘positive state obligation to offer security to individuals against other 
individuals’.7 To this, this author would add a fifth concept, ‘positive individual security 
against the state’, which will be clarified below. 
 
In most discussions of security there is a tendency to concentrate on ‘negative individual 
security against the state’, such as Article 5(1) of the ECHR – ‘Everyone has a right to liberty 
and security of person’ – and particularly the ‘liberty’ element of the right – protecting a 
person from ‘arbitrary state’ interference – at the expense of ‘security’. Again, an ideological 
                                                 
4 Rhonda Powell, ‘The Concept of Security’ University of Oxford Socio-Legal Review, June 
2012 
http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/oslr/Papers/Entries/2012/6/21_Rhonda_Powell_files/Powell%20
%282012%29%20The%20Concept%20of%20Security.pdf (accessed 10th October 2014), at 
p.4. 
5 Piet Hein van Kempen, ‘Four Concepts of Security – A Human Rights Perspective’ (2013) 
13(1) Human Rights Law Review, 1-23, at p.1. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
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bias of liberalism is such that several human rights commentators from that tradition 
examine only ‘liberty’, paying no regard at all to ‘security’.8 Here, liberalism sets up its own 
conception of liberty as if it were a norm, relegating security as – at most – a mere 
exception or qualifier. The following sections explain these five approaches to security in 
more detail. 
 
1. ‘Negative individual security against the state’ 
 
The right to security is an example of a ‘First Generation’, ‘civil and political’, ‘negative’ right; 
a ‘freedom from’ state intrusion. ‘First Generation’ rights protect individuals from ‘arbitrary’ 
killing, torture, slavery etc by the state. This ‘substantive’ right to security of the individual 
(distinguishing it from, say, its ‘procedural’ element9) is expressly provided for by several 
international and regional human rights documents. For example, Article 3 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states: ‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and 
security of person’ and Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
                                                 
8 Eg. Javaid Rehman, International Human Rights Law. 2nd ed. Pearson, 2010, at pp.200-203; 
Ilias Bantekas and Lutz Oette, International Human Rights Law and Practice. Cambridge 
University Press, 2013, at pp.338-345. 
9 For example, Article 9(1) of the ICCPR also discusses the ‘procedural’ elements of the right: 
‘No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such 
procedure as are established by law.’ What these ‘procedural’ rights are, are stated in 
Articles 9(2)-9(4); these include knowing the grounds for a detention by the state and the 
charges against a person, being brought promptly before a judge and being entitled to trial 
within a reasonable time or to release. Articles 5(1) of the ECHR is similar in wording to 
Article 9(1) of the ICCPR, and Articles 5(2)-5(4) of the ECHR provide similar ‘procedural’ 
safeguards to Articles 9(2)-9(4) of the ICCPR. 
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(ICCPR) states: ‘Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.’ Regionally, there is 
also Article 5(1) of the ECHR, which was quoted above. 
 
It will be recalled that in most discussions of the ‘substantive’ right to security of the person, 
there is a tendency to concentrate on the ‘liberty’ element at the expense of the ‘security’ 
aspect. This ideological bias is perhaps no coincidence in the light of cases where the right 
has been examined. For example, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in East 
African Asians v. United Kingdom10 ruled that ‘security of person’ must be understood in the 
context of a public authority’s arbitrary interference with an individual’s physical liberty.11 
But the ECtHR in the later case of Kurt v. Turkey12 did give a more expansive interpretation 
of Article 5(1) of the ECHR, beyond the arbitrary detention of the individual. Here the court 
interpreted cases of an officially unacknowledged detention – ‘disappearances’ – as serious 
breaches of the right to security of the person, through the de facto removal of institutional 
safeguards, such as accounting for a detained person’s whereabouts, which, in this 
particular context, the state had a positive duty to provide: 
 
‘What is at stake is both the protection of the physical liberty of individuals as well as 
their personal security in a context which, in the absence of safeguards, could result 
                                                 
10 (1973) 3 EHRR 76. 
11 Ibid., at p.89. Here UK passport holders of Asian origin who had been living in East Africa 
were denied permission to remain in the UK. 
12 (1998) 27 EHRR 373. The case concerned the disappearance of a Turkish citizen after his 
arrest by Turkish authorities. Requests by his family for information and an investigation as 
to his whereabouts were unsuccessful. 
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in a subversion of the rule of law and place detainees beyond the reach of the most 
rudimentary forms of legal protection.’13 
 
Thus, the ‘negative’ right to security of the person can derive some independent substantive 
content from a presumed right to liberty. Other approaches to the right to security are 
explored in the following sub-sections. 
 
2. ‘Security as justification to limit human rights’ 
 
Many individual human rights, whether they be guaranteed by international, regional 
and/or domestic instruments, are ‘qualified’, in that they can be infringed by the state for 
legitimate purposes, one of which is safeguarding security. Article 19(2) of the ICCPR states: 
‘Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression…’ But according to Article 19(3) 
there are express limits to this freedom: ‘The exercise of the rights provided for in 
paragraph 2 carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to 
certain restrictions…(b) For the protection of national security or of public order...’ 
Regionally, Article 10(1) of the ECHR is the right to freedom of expression but it is qualified, 
too, by Article 10(2), in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, 
                                                 
13 [123]. The court said that having assumed control over an individual it was incumbent on 
the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts: ‘For this reason, Article 5 must be 
seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of 
disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a 
person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since.’ [124] 
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for the prevention of disorder or crime etc. In addition to such ‘qualifications’ of general 
applicability, human rights law also provides for ‘derogations’, suspending specified 
freedoms in, say, times of ‘public emergency threatening the life of the nation’. Article 4 (1) 
of the ICCPR, for example, permits derogations in such circumstances ‘to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation.’14 
 
3. ‘Positive individual security against the state’ 
 
Under human rights law an individual’s right to security can also be interpreted as an 
example of a ‘Second Generation’, ‘economic, social and cultural’, ‘positive’ right of the 
individual; a ‘right to’ secure a collectively funded public service of various kinds, including 
pensions, social security and educational opportunities. For example Article 22 of the UDHR 
states: ‘Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security...’ Similarly, Article 
9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) states: ‘The 
States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, 
including social insurance.’15 
                                                 
14 But, according to Article 4(2) of the ICCPR, some fundamental rights such as freedom from 
torture, as per Article 7 of the ICCPR, and freedom from slavery, as per Article 8(1) of the 
ICCPR, can never be suspended. (For regional derogations such as those permitting 
suspensions of some ECHR rights, see Article 15 of the ECHR.) Human rights law also 
recognises ‘reservations’ which are a caveat to a state’s acceptance of a treaty. The United 
States, for example, has five reservations in relation to the ICCPR. Article 7 of the ICCPR is 
the prohibition on torture. One of America’s reservations is that the country’s obligations 
under Article 7 extend only as far as its domestic constitutional limits on torture, that is, the 
Eighth Amendment to its Constitution, the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 
15 Unlike its companion agreement, the ICCPR, the ICESCR is more of a ‘promotional’ 
convention. This is because it is not intended for immediate implementation; the state 
16 
 
4. ‘International or collective security’ 
 
The right to security also extends to a ‘Third Generation’, ‘collective’ right of peoples and 
groups of individuals. For example, Article 23(1) of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) states: ‘All peoples shall have the right to national and international 
peace and security.’ The Charter of the United Nations (UN) recognises collective rights to 
security, too: for example, one of the purposes of the UN, as per Article 1(1) of the Charter, 
is ‘to maintain international peace and security…’ To that end, Article 2 obliges members of 
the UN to ‘settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered’ and must ‘refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state…’ To monitor compliance with these obligations, the 
Charter has created an executive body, the UN Security Council (UNSC), which is in 
permanent session at UN headquarters in New York. Article 24(1) of the Charter confers 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on the UNSC. 
This is not merely an ideal or aspiration but a rule backed up by sanctions. For example, in 
disputes between nations of the UN, which threaten international peace and security, the 
Security Council may authorise, say, economic or diplomatic sanctions, as per Article 41 of 
the Charter, or the use of military action, as per Article 42.16 
                                                                                                                                                        
parties, as per Article 2, having agreed only to take steps toward ‘achieving progressively the 
full realization of the rights recognized in the…Covenant’ and then subject to ‘the maximum 
of [their] available resources’. 
16 Regional security such as that concerning Europe is also maintained by the Statute of the 
Council of Europe (the ‘London Treaty’), 1949, establishing the Council of Europe (CoE). And 
encompassing European states, as well as, say, the United States and Canada, there is: the 
17 
 
International or collective security is also maintained by the four Geneva Conventions, 1949. 
Geneva IV, for example, aims to protect civilians in armed conflicts. This policy is extended 
by the First and Second Protocols, 1977. Article 48 of Protocol I states that Parties to a 
conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and 
between civilian and military objectives and, accordingly, shall direct their operations only 
against military ones. Thus, citizens shall not be the object of attack, as per Article 51(2). 
States are duty-bound, legally, to take all feasible precautions in choosing weapons and 
methods of warfare which avoid incidental loss of life, injury to civilians and damage to 
civilian objects such as homes, schools, hospitals and places of worship, as per Article 52. 
Most states in the world have ratified Protocol I so it is now widely considered to be 
‘customary international law’.17 This status means that the Protocol even binds states that 
have not ratified it, such as the USA, Israel, India and Pakistan. State parties to the Protocol 
(and the four Geneva Conventions) are under an express obligation to search for suspected 
offenders, regardless of their nationality and of the place of the offence, and either bring 
them before their own courts or hand them over to another party for trial.18 In international 
law this principle is known as ‘universal jurisdiction’. Article 1 of the ‘Rome Statute’ 
establishes the International Criminal Court (ICC), in the Hague, the Netherlands, which has 
jurisdiction, since July 2002, to try individuals accused of the ‘most serious crimes of 
                                                                                                                                                        
North Atlantic (‘Washington’) Treaty, 1949, establishing the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO); and the Helsinki Final Act, 1975, establishing the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
17 International Committee of the Red Cross, Appeal by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross on the 20th Anniversary of the Adoption of the Additional Protocols of 1977 31st 
October 1997 https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jnux.htm 
(accessed 12th March 2015). 
18 International Committee of the Red Cross, United Nations, General Assembly, 65th 
session, Sixth Committee, item 86, statement by the ICRC, New York. 15th October 2010 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/united-nations-universal-
jurisdiction-statement-2010-10-15.htm (accessed 12th March 2015). 
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international concern’ – ‘Genocide’, ‘Crime Against Humanity’ and ‘War Crimes’ – as per 
Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute respectively.19 (But, as per Articles 12-13, the ICC 
does not have the power to exercise ‘universal jurisdiction’.20) 
 
Collective security is sometimes referred to as ‘human security’, or at least ‘human security’ 
is an element of ‘collective security’.21 ‘Human security’ was one of a number of 
international principles agreed at the World Summit in 2005. These were subsequently 
adopted by a resolution of the High Level Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly in 
September 2005.22 In specific reference to ‘human security’, paragraph 143 of the 
Resolution affirms a link between human rights and state activity oriented towards 
provisions designed to provide security for those in a condition of fear and poverty.23 
                                                 
19 A person tried and convicted at the ICC is Thomas Lubanga – see, for example: David 
Johnson, ‘Thomas Lubanga Sentenced to 14 Years for Congo War Crimes’ The Guardian. 10th 
July 2012 http://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/jul/10/icc-sentences-thomas-lubanga-14-
years (accessed 12th March 2015). 
20 The ICC has jurisdiction only over: i) nationals of states that have signed up to the Rome 
Statute ii) individuals who have committed crimes in territories that have signed up to the 
Rome Statute and iii) a State not party to the Statute, where it decides to accept the court's 
jurisdiction over a specific crime that has been committed within its territory, or by one of 
its nationals.  
21 Hitoshi Nasu, ‘The Place of Human Security in Collective Security’ (2013) 18(1) Journal of 
Conflict and Security Law, 85-102, at p.97. 
22 UN General Assembly, ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ A/RES/60/1, September 2005. 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/60/1. In 2012 the UN 
General Assembly expanded on its earlier human security resolution – see: – UN General 
Assembly, ‘Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security of the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome’ A/RES/66/290, September 2012. 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=%20A/RES/66/290. 
23 Hitoshi Nasu, op.cit., at p.99. Nasu also notes a broader approach to human security, 
encompassing a wide range of security issues such as economic security, energy security 
and environmental security. But he says that this expanded conception of human security 
has been criticised for being all-encompassing with an endless list of security issues, making 
the notion too ambiguous to be of any use for policy-making (at p.100). For those who 
advocate a more expansive approach to security such as access to resources, water or 
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According to this approach, human security is not conceived abstractly as a right-in-principle 
with little attention to its practical enforcement and context. Instead, it is squarely placed 
within the context of violence and conflict, such as the impact of sanctions on civilians, the 
protection of civilians, children and women in armed conflict, and the regulation of the arms 
trade. It was this conception of human security which provided a theoretical foundation for 
the development of the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept to protect civilian populations.24 
 
The ‘responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity’ (‘R2P’) was also a principle endorsed at the UN World Summit in 
2005.25 Here emphasis must be placed upon the phrase ‘responsibility’, to note that this 
affirms a duty on states not to remain neutral in the face of genocide whether at home, 
within the immediate region or even globally. Of note is paragraph 138 of the resolution 
adopted by the High Level Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly in 2005. This 
imposes not only positive obligations on countries to protect their civilians (‘Pillar I’), but 
also duties upon the international community to help states meet those obligations (‘Pillar 
II’). If a state has ‘manifestly failed’ in its duty to protect, then paragraph 139 of the 
resolution refers to obligations to take concrete and collective interventionist measures on a 
case by case basis (‘Pillar III’). 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
health, see, for example: Sandra Fredman, ‘The Positive Right to Security’ in Benjamin J. 
Goold and Liora Lazarus (eds), Security and Human Rights. Hart Publishing, 2007, 307-324. 
24 Ibid. On this issue, see also: S Neil Macfarlane, ‘Human Security and the Law of States’ in 
Benjamin J. Goold and Liora Lazarus (eds), op.cit., 346-361. 
25 UN General Assembly, ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ A/RES/60/1, September, 2005. 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/60/1  
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Internationally, therefore, ‘Pillar I’ of ‘R2P’, for example, obliges states to take positive 
measures to protect their civilian populations from serious harms such as genocide and 
crimes against humanity. Contrary to the traditional liberal hostility to the state, and 
support for the exemption of non-state actors from human rights obligations, ‘R2P’ applies 
even where the harm has been inflicted by third parties such as armed rebel groups. Such a 
‘positive’ duty, enforceable against non-state actors, is well developed in human rights law. 
(The state should have had knowledge of the threat but did not act reasonably in averting 
it.) This approach to security is discussed in the next sub-section. 
 
5. ‘Positive state obligation to offer security to individuals against other individuals’ 
 
The final security concept is one which this author has devoted much of his academic 
writing, and sought to expand for reasons of public protection. This concept requires states 
to take ‘positive’ measures to prevent harms committed by non-state actors. In protecting 
individuals from violations of rights by third parties – killing, torture, enforced 
disappearance, slavery, for example – states are positively obliged to criminalise such 
abuses and to actively take measures to investigate, prosecute, convict and adequately 
punish those found to be responsible for these human rights violations. At an international 
level it will recalled that Article 9(1) of the ICCPR asserts a right to liberty and security of 
person. The distinctly liberal ‘negative’ element of the right – that is, ‘freedom from’ state 
‘intrusion’ – was discussed above. However, the key point here is that this freedom also 
imposes a ‘positive’ duty on the state to formulate policies and take concrete measures 
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preventing infringements of the right by third parties. The UN Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) monitors states’ compliance of the ICCPR. ‘General Comment No.8’ of the HRC, which 
references Article 9 of the ICCPR, is also coy when it comes to a discussion of the meaning 
and scope of ‘security’ (preferring to prioritise ‘liberty’): devoting only eight paragraphs to 
this key issue out of a total of 67. That said, it does offer a broad explanation of the right’s 
security element. Here, paragraph 7 is significant. First, in reference to the ‘negative’ part of 
the security right, it re-affirms that a right to security protects individuals against intentional 
infliction of bodily or mental injury by the state. This applies regardless of whether or not 
the victim is detained.26 But the paragraph is especially important as it illustrates the 
‘positive’ nature of the right, to include an entitlement to state action to protect individuals 
under threat from actual or likely harm inflicted by other individuals, including effective 
prosecution for past violations:  
 
‘The right to personal security also obliges States parties to take appropriate 
measures in response to death threats against persons in the public sphere, and 
more generally to protect individuals from foreseeable threats to life or bodily 
integrity proceeding from…private actors. States parties must take both prospective 
measures to prevent future injury and retrospective measures such as enforcement 
of criminal laws in response to past injury.’27  
 
                                                 
26 HRC Sixteenth session (1982), General Comment No. 8: Article 9 (Right to Liberty and 
Security of Persons) 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2
fCCPR%2fGEC%2f6628&Lang=en (accessed 10th October 2014). 
27 Ibid. [7].  
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The HRC has, therefore, reinterpreted the right to security beyond the traditional ‘negative’ 
context of protection of individuals from ‘arbitrary’ detention by the state to taking 
‘appropriate’ measures in response to, say, ‘foreseeable’ death threats by third parties. 
Thus, the HRC found a violation of Article 9(1) in Jayawardena v. Sri Lanka.28 Here, the 
claimant alleged an infringement of his right to security, after the President of Sri Lanka had 
accused him in public of being involved with the terror group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Elam (‘LTTE’), putting his life at risk. The HRC found that these accusations by the President 
had caused the claimant to be a victim of threats to his security, in violation of Article 9(1).29  
 
Regionally, the concept of ‘positive’ obligations seems to be most developed in the case law 
of the ECHR, such as Article 3, freedom from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment 
and punishment;30 Article 4(1), freedom from slavery and servitude,31 including human 
trafficking;32 Article 5, the right to liberty and security of person;33 and Article 8, the right to 
private and family life, home and correspondence.34 The important point here is that, 
despite the ECHR’s general reiteration of the liberal model of negative rights, in at least 
some instances ‘positive’ obligations can be drawn from the text of the right itself. For 
instance, Article 2(1) of the ECHR states that everyone’s right to life shall be protected by 
law. Similarly, Article 6 confers a right on individuals to receive a ‘fair trial’ by an 
independent and impartial court or tribunal, which requires states and perhaps regional 
                                                 
28 CCPR/C/75/D/916/2000. 
29 [7.2]. Sri Lanka was also in violation of Article 9(1) by failing to investigate the complaints 
of the claimant about the death threats he had received [7.3]. 
30 MC v. Bulgaria (2005) 40 EHRR 20. 
31 Siliadin v. France (2006) 43 EHRR 15. 
32 Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia (2010) 51 EHRR 1. 
33 Storck v. Germany (2006) 43 EHRR 6. 
34 Marckx v. Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330; X and Y v. Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235. 
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sovereign bodies to publicly fund and staff an independent and adequate legal system that 
is fit for purpose. (Detailed analyses of most ECHR rights and their ‘positive’ nature are 
undertaken in the attached published works so are mentioned in this piece only in passing.) 
 
Individual protections aside, the ECHR also imposes a ‘positive’ duty on member states to 
respect human rights in general. Indeed, the full title of the ECHR is the ‘Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’.35 Article 13 of the ECHR, for 
example, also requires states to take measures guaranteeing an effective remedy where 
there has been a violation of a right.36 And of particular significance for the meaning and 
scope of a right to security there is Article 1 of the ECHR: ‘The High Contracting Parties shall 
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of 
this Convention [my italics].’ (Interestingly, we can question why security is specifically 
referred to in Article 5 of the ECHR but not in other articles? This does not imply that article 
5 is an ‘exception’ reflecting the lower status afforded to security. Instead, Article 1 affirms 
the centrality of security built into each of the ECHR rights rendering reference to it in any 
particular right redundant. Powell is correct, therefore, when she claims: ‘Given the duty to 
secure all rights in Article 1, it seems unnecessary to specifically mention security [in Article 
5] at all.’37) 
 
                                                 
35 Dimitros Xenos, The Positive Obligations of the State Under the European Convention of 
Human Rights. Routledge, 2012, at p.11. 
36 Ibid., at p.21. 
37 Rhonda Powell, ‘The Right to Security of Person in European Court of Human Rights 
Jurisprudence’ (2007) 6 European Human Rights Law Review, 649-662, at p.661. 
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This author has identified many approaches to security as a human right, encompassing 
both ‘negative’ as well as ‘positive’ elements, but there is a tendency to see ‘liberty’ and 
‘security’ as representing the same freedom (with an ideological bias towards the former 
rather than the latter). In this respect, therefore, Lazarus is perplexed. She states that 
national security policy, say, since the September 11th (‘9/11’) attacks in New York and 
Washington in 2001, has overwhelmingly focused on the ‘balance’ between ‘security’ on the 
one hand and ‘liberty’ on the other. Given that liberty and security are articulated as part of 
the same right in most human rights documents, she suggests that this ‘binary 
opposition…is curious’.38 She concludes: amidst the extensive public debate on the 
appropriate balance between the maintenance of national, public and individual security on 
the one hand, and the protection of individual liberty on the other ‘remarkably little 
attention has been paid to the question of what precisely is meant by the right to security in 
the legal sense’.39 The implication of the argument here is that a human right to security, in 
law, could therefore be said to be ‘up for grabs’. In the next section, the author seeks to 
provide a philosophical base for the approach to security that he has adopted in the case 
studies that comprise his published works forming part of this PhD by publication. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Ibid. Lazarus is not alone in being perplexed at this; see, for example: Sandra Fredman, 
op.cit., at p.307. 
39 Ibid., at p.327.  
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Theoretical justifications for the author’s right to security 
 
The author’s approach in his attached publications is to broaden the ‘positive’ legal right to 
security from its apparent emphasis on protection of a specific individual, or individuals, 
from a foreseeable harm, to a much wider group of people. The basis for doing so is, say, 
the ‘positive’ obligation imposed on states to prevent violations of the right to life by non-
state actors, such as terrorists. A foundation for the author’s conception of a right to 
security could be grounded in ‘natural’ law theory, especially the concept of ‘natural’ rights. 
Some natural law theorists argue that rights are not created by governments but exist as 
pre-political rights that are anterior to them and their legislative recognition and that 
legitimate governments are, in fact, created to secure these rights.  
 
1. Hobbesian ‘absolutism’ 
 
A particular feature of natural law theory has been the social-contract philosophy, a key 
exponent of which was Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Hobbes’ most famous work was 
Leviathan which was first published in 1651. Hobbes lived during a turbulent time in 
England’s history – the rule of King Charles I, the Civil War and the Cromwellian 
Commonwealth – so he was greatly concerned at the evil of state collapse. He sought, 
therefore, to effect a strong central authority that maintained peace and order. If not, 
anarchy, which Hobbes described as a ‘state of nature’, would ensue – a place where only 
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the strong would survive.40 Human life in the ‘state of nature’ would be ‘solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish, and short’.41 To avoid such horrors, a tacit social contract – a bargain – 
between the state and the individual was, therefore, required, whereby the latter agreed to 
surrender many, but not all, of their rights hypothetically ascribed to them by natural law, in 
exchange for the former providing security from the ‘state of nature’.42 
 
For the greater good of peace and order, Hobbes said that individuals had to accept ‘some 
incommodity’.43 What might this ‘incommodity’ be? He believed that ‘the greatest that in 
any form of government can possibly happen to people in general is scarce sensible, in 
respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities that accompany a Civil War’,44 suggesting a 
significant erosion of the individual’s natural rights was required in exchange for state 
protection. So, for Hobbes, even the burdens of oppressive government were better than a 
complete chaos of the kind individuals suffer in war-torn contexts where social security, 
policing and law enforcement have broken down. 
 
                                                 
40 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-wealth 
Ecclesiasticall and Civill 1651 
http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/hobbes/Leviathan.pdf accessed 10 
October 2014, Chapter XIII (accessed 12th September 2014), at p.78. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., Chapter XIV, at p.82. 
43 Ibid., Chapter XVIII, at p.113. 
44 Ibid. 
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Hobbes literally described the power of the sovereign in the social contract as ‘absolute’45 – 
and indeed an all-powerful, authoritarian state is inferred from the degree of curtailment of 
the individual’s natural rights – but there were limits to the state’s power. The bargain 
between the individual and the sovereign was revocable: it was qualified and conditional on 
the latter providing effective security from the ‘state of nature’ including threats posed by 
non-state actors. That is, when the state ceased to fulfil its covenant of protection it had 
exceeded its authority and the individual no longer owed the state a duty of obedience: ‘The 
obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the 
power lasteth by which he is able to protect them.’46 Indeed, when the state failed to 
provide security, the individual then had a right to protect themselves – a ‘right to resist’47 – 
there (probably) being a return to anarchy. 
 
The author finds such a theoretical approach to security particularly seductive – in the less 
secure world post ‘9/11’ he supports a significant ‘trade-off’ of liberal conceptions of human 
rights of the individual in his published works – but it ignores the reason(s) why we may be 
entertaining a right to security in the first place: to protect the very principles of democracy 
we are seeking to defend. Indeed, in condoning an oppressive government – assuming it 
continues to provide peace and order – Hobbes arguably failed to appreciate how the state 
                                                 
45 Ibid., Chapter XVII, at pp.105-106. In modern parlance Hobbesian ‘absolutism’ may be 
described as ‘hard power’. To become superior, or even invincible, the state must provide 
unequivocal support for the military, intelligence agencies and the police. The latter should 
not be inhibited by excessive legal rights and safeguards, which serve only to put, say, 
terrorists at an advantage – see, for example: Joseph S. Nye Jr, The Paradox of American 
Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone. Oxford University Press, 2002, 
at p.10. 
46 Ibid., Chapter XXI, at p.136. 
47 Ibid., Chapter XXI, at pp.133-134. 
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itself might pose a threat to security.48 Thus, the Hobbesian model does not fully 
acknowledge how the modern state can simultaneously act as a guarantor of and a threat to 
the security of individuals.49 
 
And whilst we are facing a public emergency post ‘9/11’, or at the very least we were in 
2001, are we still in such a situation to which Hobbes was referring? That is, if we did not 
subscribe to the Hobbesian-style contract, would we be facing anarchy? Arguably, we would 
be less secure, at least collectively rather than individually, but it is safe to say that this 
would not result in a collapse of civil order? Finally, the author questions whether it is valid 
to ‘trade-off’ every hypothetical natural right, such as freedom from torture (see below), in 
the cause of security. 
 
Notwithstanding these concerns, the author does not dismiss the ‘absolutism’ of Hobbes 
entirely, in formulating a theoretical basis for a right to security as advanced in his published 
works. The gross violations of human rights committed in, say, the Soviet Union and 
Germany under the brutal authorities of Josef Stalin and Adolf Hitler respectively, in the 
1930s and 40s, were classic examples where states themselves had become grave threats to 
security. Indeed, there have been more recent systematic human rights abuses by 
authorities in Rwanda in 1994, Bosnia in 1995 and Libya in 2011, as well as the ongoing 
situation in Syria. (For many of those affected by these abuses, a Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ 
                                                 
48 Liora Lazarus, ‘The Right to Security’ in Rowan Cruft, Matthew Liao and Massimo Renzo 
(eds), The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights. Oxford University Press, 2014, 1-21, 
at p.3. 
49 Ian Loader and Neil Walker, Civilizing Security. Cambridge University Press, 2007, at p.11. 
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was probably much more preferable to the fate that awaited them.) In failing, therefore, to 
honour the deal they have struck in providing protection, these countries have therefore 
delegitimised themselves, from a Hobbesian perspective, and revoked the duty of 
obedience, permitting the individual a ‘right to resist’. Thus, in articulating some limits to 
the power of the state, the ‘absolutism’, or ‘potential absolutism’, of Hobbesian philosophy 
still has much to offer the author in constructing a theoretical justification for his right to 
security. That said, as with any political and constitutional theory this approach has its own 
limitations. The author in this ‘overarching’ PhD thesis is therefore developing a conceptual 
model which involves a modification of the Hobbesian position through the incorporation of 
aspects of liberalism as supported by, say John Locke. 
 
2. Lockean liberalism 
 
For Hobbes bad government was better than no government. Not so for John Locke (1632-
1704) who was writing a generation after Hobbes. Locke’s principal work, Two Treatises of 
Government, which was written between about 1679 and 1683, but not published until 
1690, was a reaction to the allegedly tyrannical government of James II. Locke seemingly 
agreed with Hobbes that the social contract was relinquished if the state was no longer able 
to protect the citizen from anarchy.50 But Locke further believed that the individual’s 
                                                 
50  John Locke, Two Treatises of Government In the Former, The False Principles and 
Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer, and His Followers, Are Detected and Overthrown: The 
Latter, Is an Essay Concerning the Original, Extent, and End, of Civil Government 
http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/government.pdf accessed 10 
October 2014 (accessed 10th October 2014), at p.201. 
30 
 
obligation to obey the state, in return for security, ceased in circumstances less demanding 
than a breakdown of peace and order.51 Locke justified such a position thus: 
 
‘To tell people they may provide for themselves by erecting a new legislative, when, 
by oppression, artifice, or being delivered over to a foreign power, their old one is 
gone, is only to tell them they may expect relief when it is too late, and the evil is 
past cure. This is, in effect, no more than to bid them first be slaves…and men can 
never be secure from tyranny if there be no means to escape it till they are perfectly 
under it.’52 
 
Furthermore, again in opposition to Hobbes, Locke viewed the ‘absolute’ power of the 
sovereign as a threat to the security of individuals. He therefore advocated a minimal state 
whose control was limited to its preservation and could not be used ‘to destroy, enslave, or 
designedly to impoverish the subjects.’53 With a significant reduction in the sovereign’s 
power many more individual freedoms were guaranteed: Locke identified ‘natural rights’ of 
the individual as ‘life, liberty, and estate (property)’ and argued that such fundamental 
rights could never be sacrificed in the social contract.54 
 
                                                 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., at p.163. 
54 Ibid. 
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The social contract theory of Locke was particularly prevalent in the 17th and 18th Centuries 
and influenced the revolutions of America and France. For example, the American 
Declaration of Independence, on 4th July 1776, in Philadelphia, makes explicit reference to 
this philosophy: ‘That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these 
Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government 
[my italics]…’ The Declaration also recognises the fundamental importance of natural rights: 
‘We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty 
and the pursuit of Happiness [my italics].’ A precursor to the Declaration of Independence 
was the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776). Section 3 states: ‘When any government shall 
be found inadequate…a majority of the community has an indubitable, inalienable, and 
indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most 
conducive to the public weal.’ Indeed, section 3 expressly refers to the state’s duty to 
provide security: ‘That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, 
protection, and security of the people, nation, or community…’ France’s Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) expresses similar values. In particular, Article 2 is 
explicit about the rights of citizens to sever the social contract in circumstances less 
demanding than the Hobbesian state: ‘The aim of all political association is the preservation 
of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, 
and resistance to oppression [my italics].’55 
                                                 
55 The state’s duty to provide security, emanating from, say, social contract theory, still has 
contemporary resonance, especially amongst liberals. For example, following Hurricane 
Katrina, decimating New Orleans and the State of Louisiana in America in 2005, Ignatieff, a 
former Leader of the Liberal Party of Canada, argued that the US authorities had failed 
spectacularly in their obligations to help those affected: ‘‘We are American’ a 
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Liberal philosophy, as propounded by John Locke, is concerned about a right to security, as 
is the ‘absolutism’, or ‘potential absolutism’, of Thomas Hobbes. But unlike the author in his 
attached published works, Lockean liberalism is unwilling to surrender some fundamental, 
‘natural’ rights such as liberty and rights to property for peace and order, because too much 
sacrifice by the individual is itself a threat to security. A noted opponent of, say, the social 
contract theory, and the liberal influenced Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen in France in particular, was Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). Bentham also criticized 
the apparent neglect of liberalism to circumscribe the breadth of ‘natural’ rights. 
 
3. The utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham 
 
Jeremy Bentham argued that contracts came from government, not government from 
contracts, describing the latter as ‘pure fiction’. Thus, he also mocked the idea of ‘natural’ 
rights in Article 2 of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man: ‘That which has no 
existence cannot be destroyed – that which cannot be destroyed cannot require anything to 
preserve it from destruction. Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible 
rights, rhetorical nonsense – nonsense upon stilts.’56 
                                                                                                                                                        
woman…proclaimed on television. She spoke with scathing anger, but also with 
astonishment that she should be required to remind Americans of such a simple fact. She – 
not the governor, not the mayor, not the president – understood that the catastrophe was a 
test of the bonds of citizenship and that the government had failed the test.’ – see: Michael 
Ignatieff, ‘The Broken Contract’ New York Times. 25th September 2005 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/25/magazine/25wwln.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0 
(accessed 31st October 2014). 
56 Jeremy Bentham, ‘Critique of the Doctrine of Inalienable, Natural Rights’ 
http://www.ucs.louisiana.edu/~ras2777/judpol/benthamrights.htm (Accessed 10th January 
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Bentham also criticised the seeming ‘absolute’ nature of natural rights such as ‘liberty’: 
‘What these…governors of mankind appear not to know, is, that all rights are made at the 
expense of liberty.’ He explained what he meant by this, by reference to, say, ‘Laws creative 
of rights of property’. He asked how was property given? He replied: ‘By restraining 
liberty...How is your house made yours? By debarring every one else from the liberty of 
entering it without your leave.’57 This quotation is significant, not only because it taunts the 
apparent Lockean approach to absolute freedoms, but presumes that individuals also have 
ultimate responsibilities to respect the liberties – in this case the property – of others. 
‘Responsibilities’ is an essential critique of liberalism prevalent in the philosophies of, say, 
communitarianism, which this author adopts to support his foundation for a group right to 
security, so will be discussed in much more detail later. 
 
Bentham adopted a similar position in relation to the apparent absolute nature of ‘security’ 
as a natural right. That said, he seemed to approve of security as a concept, just not as a 
right that could never be abrogated, but one ‘posited’ from law,58 meaning that the state 
was a source of the right: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
2015). 
57 Ibid. 
58 For this reason Jeremy Bentham is one of the founding fathers of ‘legal positivism’, the 
philosophy that law emanates from legal sources such as statutes, common law etc, rather 
than the liberal approach, at least in its traditional forms, that laws emanated from God and 
governments were created to secure these laws. For other ‘legal positivists’ see, for 
example: John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832); and H.L.A., The 
Concept of Law (1961). 
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‘We know what it is for men to live without government…to live without rights…for 
we see instances of such a way of life – we see it in many savage nations, or rather 
races of mankind: no habit of obedience, and thence no government – no 
government, and thence no laws – no laws, and thence no such things as rights – no 
security – no property.’59 
 
How might then security be exercised in the ‘utopia’ of Bentham? In Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals, which was first published in 1789, Bentham wrote that nature had 
placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It was 
for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. 
They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think.60 An action may be said to be 
comfortable to the ‘principle of utility’, meaning with respect to the community at large, 
when ‘the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it 
has to diminish it’.61 How was such an ‘exercise’ to be calculated? Government objectives 
must aim to ensure, by means of careful calculation, the achievement of the greatest 
pleasure, and the minimum degree of pain, of the greatest number.62 
 
                                                 
59 Jeremy Bentham, op.cit. 
60 Jeremy Bentham, ‘Of the Principle of Utility’ Introduction to the Principles of Morals. 1789, 
Chapter One. http://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML.html (Accessed 15th April 
2015). 
61 Ibid. 
62 Jeremy Bentham, ‘Value of a Lot of Pleasure or Pain, How to be Measured’, op.cit. (1789), 
Chapter Four. 
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There is an underlying ‘utilitarian’ right to security pervading the author’s published works, 
one that ‘balances’ the right of security of the many over the individual freedoms of the 
few. Of course, ‘majoritarian’ rule – the greatest happiness of the greatest number – does 
not sit easily with liberal notions of inalienable, natural rights of the individual. Above, the 
author declined to surrender freedom from torture in, say, the Hobbesian social contract, 
but what say utilitarians about this fundamental right, especially in exceptional 
circumstances such as the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario? (This is not an issue addressed directly in 
the author’s attached works on torture so is discussed here – and later – for convenience.) 
Torture inflicts pain on the suspect, greatly reducing their happiness or utility. But 
thousands of innocent lives will be lost if the bomb explodes. So a utilitarian might argue 
that it is morally justified to inflict intense pain on one person if doing this will prevent death 
or suffering on a large scale.63 Although in this situation the benefits of torture might 
outweigh the cost of harm to the individual, Sandel, for example, questions whether is it 
appropriate to do the calculation that utilitarianism requires: consequences of our actions 
are inherently unknowable – we do not have the benefit of hindsight.64 Furthermore, whilst 
utilitarianism weighs preferences without judging them – everyone’s preferences count 
equally – is this so in reality?65 And is it possible to measure and compare all values and 
                                                 
63 Michael J Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? Penguin Books, 2010, at p.38. 
64 Ibid., at p.39. 
65 Ibid., at p.41. 
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goods on a single scale?66 Moreover, rights are made a matter of calculation, not principle.67 
Finally, there may just be a nagging feeling that torture, for example, is simply wrong.68 
 
As will be seen from many of his published works, the author is seemingly attracted to a 
utilitarian approach to security and human rights, but is unprepared to trade every right, 
such as freedom from torture, in the pursuit of group security. There is an argument for 
some ‘balance’, however, between other freedoms of the individual, to do as they please, 
and society’s need for protection against the harm that that person may commit, which 
some within contemporary liberalism have sought to advance. 
 
 
                                                 
66 Ibid., at p.46. 
67 Ibid., at p.260. Sandel says that much of the criticisms of Bentham’s utilitarianism were 
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4. The contemporary liberalism of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin 
 
Modern perspectives on liberalism are epitomised by, say, John Rawls and Ronald 
Dworkin.69 Liberalism is very much concerned with individual autonomy; people should be 
free to live their lives, to choose and pursue values for themselves, so the state should 
remain neutral (or at least act only in an advisory capacity) on issues such as these.70 Thus, 
in terms of, say, freedom of expression, censorship by the state, for example, imposes the 
state’s values on individuals, thus compromising their freedom to choose. In A Theory of 
Justice Rawls founded a conception of justice on respect for the individual. Rawls arrived at 
his notion of justice by considering what individuals in the ‘original position’, a 
reformulation of Hobbes’ ‘state of nature’, would choose as principles of justice for the 
basic structure of society. They would decide behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, which prevented 
them from knowing their place in society, their class position or social status, their fortune 
in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, their intelligence and their strength. This 
ensured that no one was advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles.71 Because 
of the uncertainty of the ‘veil’ process, Rawls believed two principles of justice would be 
chosen in the ‘original position’. One of these was – ‘each person is to have an equal right to 
the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others’.72 That is, each 
person would have the maximum amount of liberty compatible with the same amount of 
liberty for everyone else, which even the general welfare could not override. (Individuals 
                                                 
69 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously. Duckworth, 1977. 
70 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press, 1971, at p.448. 
71 Ibid., at p.7. 
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would not choose, say, a utilitarian approach to decision-making for fear that they would 
end up in the minority being oppressed by the majority.73) 
 
Dworkin has written about liberty and security post ‘9/11’ in particular.74 It is said that 
fairness to criminal suspects requires only that an appropriate ‘trade-off’, or ‘balance’, is 
struck between two values—freedom and security—each of which can sometimes be served 
only at the cost of the other. Because terrorism is a horrific threat to security, striking the 
balance differently for that crime is justified; and it is therefore not unfair to subject 
suspected terrorists to a higher risk of unjust conviction. But Dworkin disagrees: ‘the 
familiar metaphors of trade-off and balance are deeply misleading’, because they suggest a 
false description of the decision that the nation must make: 
 
‘If that really were our choice, it would be an easy one to make. None of the 
administration’s decisions and proposals will affect more than a tiny number of 
American citizens: almost none of us will be indefinitely detained for minor 
violations or offenses, or have our houses searched without our knowledge, or find 
ourselves brought before military tribunals on grave charges carrying the death 
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penalty. Most of us pay almost nothing in personal freedom when such measures 
are used against those the President suspects of terrorism.’75 
 
Dworkin also notes that the rights that have evolved are those that are deemed the 
minimum owed to anyone who is accused of a serious crime and pursued and tried within 
the system of criminal justice. He believes that fairness requires, as a matter of equal 
concern for anyone who might be innocent, that these rights are extended to everyone 
brought into the system; people accused of more serious crimes should not be entitled to 
less protection: ‘If they are innocent, the injustice of convicting and punishing them is at 
least as great as the injustice in convicting some other innocent person for a less serious 
crime. So we must reject the balancing argument—it is confused and false.’76 Thus, unlike 
the author in his published works, Dworkin appears to dismiss any idea about a balance 
between liberty and security, even post ‘9/11’.77 Other contemporary liberal writers such as 
Jeremy Waldron have also criticised such a trade-off but not rejected such an exercise out of 
hand.78 
 
 
                                                 
75 Ibid. 
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77 Does this therefore contradict what he has said elsewhere? Dworkin is seemingly not 
averse to some balance ‘to prevent catastrophe’ such that we ‘need not go so far as to say 
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5. Contemporary liberalism receptive to ‘balance’, post ‘9/11’ 
 
In seemingly echoing Bentham’s rejection of Lockean liberalism, Waldron argues that liberty 
cannot be comprehensive even under the most favourable circumstances—‘nobody argues 
for anarchy’—and security has to be given some weight in determining how much liberty 
people should have. So there is always a balance to be struck.79 And that the balance is 
‘bound to change’ as the threat to security becomes graver or more imminent.80 That said, 
Waldron thinks the ‘balancing rhetoric’ needs to be subjected to ‘careful scrutiny’, and calls 
for, say, evidence justifying greater security:  
 
‘If we do remain receptive to the need to compromise civil liberty, we must insist 
that those who talk the balancing-talk step up to the plate with some actual 
predictions about effectiveness. We should not give up our liberties, or anyone else’s 
liberties, for the sake of purely symbolic gains in the war against terrorism.’81 
 
Supporting a balance between security and liberty – a reconciliation between the two 
principles – but presenting differing liberal opinions about where such a balance should lie 
was the purpose of a collection of essays, Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’.82 One of the 
                                                 
79 Ibid., at p.192. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Richard Ashby Wilson, ‘Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’’ in Richard Ashby Wilson (ed), 
Human Rights in the 'War on Terror'. Cambridge University Press, 2005, 1-36. Benjamin 
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contributors to the collection, David Luban, presents a strong liberal defence of human 
rights at the expense of security,83 and shares similar concerns about the liberty/security 
trade-off previously expressed by Dworkin and Waldron.84 He believes that we are almost in 
a state of ‘perpetual emergency’: ‘9/11’ was an emergency but we are still facing threats to 
liberty several years later.85 And in response to claims that those who seek to destroy 
democracy are not entitled to its benefits (which is explored in more detail later, when 
discussing, say, Article 17 of the ECHR, the prohibition of abuse of rights), he states that ‘the 
very posing of the rhetorical question already assumes guilt’.86 
 
Another contributor to the collection, Fernando Teson, is seemingly less liberal in his 
approach than Luban.87 Teson describes the Hobbesian approach as a ‘conservative 
conception of security’ and maintains that this level of public safety can only be achieved in 
a ‘police state’.88 He distinguishes ‘liberalism 1’, where liberties are curtailed to protect 
security, from ‘liberalism 2’.89 Those that subscribe to the latter branch of liberalism are 
‘human rights absolutists’ who consider that a life with no rights is not worth living.90 But 
                                                                                                                                                        
Goold and Liora Lazarus have sought to reconcile the two ideals in a collection of academic 
essays, too: Liora Lazarus and Benjamin J Goold, ‘Introduction: Security and Human Rights: 
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89 Ibid. 
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Teson believes these liberals overlook threats that are directed against the very freedoms 
they wish to preserve.91 He argues that the current ‘impasse’ between security and liberty is 
between the Hobbesian approach and ‘liberalism 2’.92 He therefore advocates ‘liberalism 1’: 
‘I question the view that liberal values can never justify temporary justifications to the 
current level of enjoyment of freedoms.’93 But he argues that liberal security measures are 
only justified by security threats perpetrated by ‘principled evildoers’ – those who seek to 
destroy liberal-democratic society and its institutions and are prepared to die in the 
process.94 The majority of other kinds of threats to security are orchestrated by 
‘opportunistic evildoers’, such as the former leader of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, who seek an 
advantage from what they do and can be reasoned with to a greater or lesser extent.95 
According to Teson, the latter ‘do not usually meet the threshold for curtailments of 
liberty’.96 So whilst his aim of reconciling liberty and security is maybe laudable, Teson still 
expresses a too extreme liberal view for this author: Saddam Hussein, for example, 
committed horrendous abuses against the Kurdish people in the late 1990s. Is Teson saying 
that significant infringements of individual human rights to protect, say, the Kurds would 
not have been justified because of the chance that Saddam could have been dissuaded from 
committing his terrible crimes? 
                                                                                                                                                        
Capitalism and Freedom (1962); Friedrich von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (1960); and 
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Lucia Zedner is also cautious about embracing security (though like Waldron, for example, is 
not unopposed to its virtues). She suggests that if security were an unqualified good, 
logically there could not be too much of it but there are several ‘paradoxes’ associated with 
it.97 One of these is the claim that security promises reassurance but in fact increases 
anxiety: ‘Whilst security promises to enhance subjective feelings of security its pursuit often 
entails increased insecurity…It is a deep irony that, by alerting citizens to risk and scattering 
the world with visible reminders of the threat of crime, it tends to increase subjective 
insecurity.’98 
 
In a separate piece, Zedner specifically discusses the liberty/security trade-off,99 which she 
describes as ‘perilous’.100 In a section titled ‘What tips the balance?’, she believes that all 
talk of rebalancing presupposes a prior imbalance, so those proposing reform must ‘either 
identify a disequilibrium or externals factors that can be said to tip the balance out of 
kilter’.101 And she questions ‘what lies in the scales?’ In seemingly echoing previous 
concerns expressed by Sandel about the utilitarianism of Bentham, Zedner says that 
balancing presumes that the goods ostensibly placed in the scales are amenable to being 
weighed against one another. Yet it may be that they are, in practice, ‘incommensurable’.102 
That said, she is not averse to the liberty/security balance but believes a ‘principled 
approach’ to the exercise provides greater prospects of protecting rights against 
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unwarranted erosion.103 What would such a principled approach involve? Structural and 
procedural safeguards through ‘the twin engines of judicial oversight and unremitted 
defence of due-process’.104 Thus, it may be possible to enhance collective security against 
terrorism without diminishing individual security against the state.105 
 
Other contemporary liberals such as Paul Berman,106 Bruce Ackerman107 and Michael 
Ignatieff have seemingly been much more forthcoming in their support for security at the 
expense of liberty. Ignatieff, for example, a former Leader of the Liberal Party of Canada, 
has become much less liberal post ‘9/11’.108 He says that a democracy can allow its leaders 
one fatal mistake – ‘and that’s what ‘9/11’ looks like to many observers’ – but Americans 
will not forgive a second one:109 ‘We need to change the way we think, to step outside the 
confines of our cosy conservative and liberal boxes.’110 He seeks to do this in terms of ‘lesser 
evils’ – ‘to defeat evil, we may have to traffic in evils’ – indefinite detention of suspects, 
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coercive interrogations, targeted assassinations, even pre-emptive war. They can be 
justified only because they prevent the greater evil.111 
 
Ignatieff’s liberal leanings are still evident, however. He says that abridgements of the rights 
of a few are easy to justify politically when the threat of terrorism appears to endanger the 
majority. Rights exist, however, precisely to set limits to what fearful majorities can do: 
‘Rights will not have much value to us if they are easily taken away from others. So we all 
have an interest in making as few exceptions as possible.’112 He then asks: how can 
democracies resort to ‘lesser evils’ without destroying the values for which they stand? How 
can they resort to these means without succumbing to the greater?113 To police the ‘lesser 
evil’, detainees, for example, should not be permanently deprived of access to counsel and 
judicial process.114 And the liberal institutions of the state need to work effectively: it is the 
function of a legislature, a free press, a well-organized civil society and an independent 
judiciary to keep the executive under scrutiny.115 Finally, for Ignatieff, there are some 
fundamental rights that can never be curtailed, such as freedom from torture: ‘If you want 
to create terrorists, torture is a pretty sure way to do so.’116  
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In conceiving a group right to security, utilising ‘positive’ duties imposed on the state, the 
author here is not entirely convinced by Hobbesian ‘absolutism’ on the one hand and the 
excesses of liberalism, such as Teson’s ‘liberalism 2’, on the other. So – thus far, at least – he 
is attracted to the more ‘pragmatic’ (my words) theories of liberalism post ‘9/11’ echoed by, 
say, Ignatieff, which seem to draw the balance of security and rights much closer to the 
approach adopted by the author. Continuing to look at, say, liberal approaches to security, 
the author in the next section refers to commentators such as Liora Lazarus, who have 
written about a right to security, in law, in particular. 
 
A ‘positive’ right to security in law 
 
Liora Lazarus is anxious about the ambiguity of security: on the one hand it signifies a 
commitment to rights, which she claims we commonly associate with absence from 
coercion, and a commitment to coercion in the name of individual and collective security on 
the other.117 But unlike her fellow Oxford academic, Zedner, who maybe approaches 
security from more of a criminal justice perspective, Lazarus does so from more of a legal 
one. First, Lazarus believes that the right to security is simply too broad to be legally 
                                                                                                                                                        
Ethics in an Age of Terror. Edinburgh University Press, 2005, at p.141. He justifies the 
position thus: ‘Those who think this allows too much probably underestimate just how 
important accurate and timely information can be in a war on terror, and just how resistant 
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117 Liora Lazarus, ‘The Right to Security – Securing Rights or Securitising Rights’ in Robert 
Dickinson et al (eds), Examining Critical Perspectives on Human Rights. Cambridge University 
Press, 2012, 87-106, at p.89. 
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workable.118 Its apparent lack of sufficient certainty blurs the rights that flow from it, or 
even the correlative duties imposed on the state that might allow for such rights to be 
fulfilled.119 And since the right is connected to perceptions of future risk, she believes that 
there is no end to the kinds of risks that would have to be averted.120 Equally, it says nothing 
about how foreseeable the risks have to be in order to establish a breach of the right.121 
 
Lazarus’s objections do not end there: she is also concerned about ‘duplication’, in that the 
right to security does not seem to add anything to the other rights that are meant to be 
secured.122 Such a right, she claims, should only protect that which other self-standing and 
established rights cannot, on their face, protect. Consequently, the ‘right to security’ should 
not encompass long established and self-standing rights such as the rights to life, liberty, 
freedom from torture and so on.123 She continues: if the law is unclear about the contours 
of the right to security, she believes that politics has shed even less light: ‘What we do know 
is that politicians deploy the right to security with enthusiasm, and the right is becoming an 
increasingly important rhetorical tool in security politics globally.’124 Importantly, politicians 
claim that the ‘right to security’ is a ‘basic’ or meta-right’ on which all other rights are 
based.125 But this risks slipping from a right to security merely existing to affirm other rights, 
that is, a ‘right to secure rights’, to a belief which actively ‘securitises’ those rights. And in 
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invoking security as a means to extend the ‘state’s coercive reach’, we may end up ‘righting 
security’.126 Lazarus therefore calls for the courts to stem the ‘rhetoric of security’ in a 
global environment of insecurity and ensure that the right does not become the catch-all 
justificatory foundation for a range of self-standing fundamental rights.127 
 
However, if there is to be a right, Lazarus believes that it should be legally workable; there 
must be far more clarification of the freedom.128 In so doing, she offers some advice: it must 
be specific, that is, it should correlate to clear and meaningful obligations and duties ‘rather 
than empty rhetorical statements’.129And it must be rigorously and narrowly construed,130 
otherwise there is a real danger that the right to security might not result just in the erosion 
of rights which protect liberty ‘but could displace a hard-won, carefully reasoned, yet fragile, 
consensus around the foundation of fundamental rights.’131 
 
Hein van Kempen, who like Zedner, comes to security from a criminal justice perspective, 
also expresses concern about the concept. But he is seemingly original in that he bases his 
fears on an expansive interpretation of ‘positive’ obligations. There is a contradiction, he 
argues, in that with these duties, human rights no longer serve to control and restrain the 
power of the state, but that they also legitimise and even require the use of that power.132 
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And since ‘positive’ obligations entail the use of criminal law against private parties, these 
obligations even require the state to infringe their human rights.133 He concludes: 
 
‘The human rights concept of ‘positive’ security offers the authorities the 
possibility—which they are actually utilising—to adduce human rights in defence of 
all kinds of measures that limit liberty and it makes it easier for them to politicise or 
even exploit the human rights argument. Human rights can thus be turned in on 
themselves, neutralising their principles.’134 
 
Xenos seemingly agrees: he believes that the open ended scope of ‘positive’ obligations 
creates problems;135 they are often used as a buzzword for every measure of compliance 
with human rights standards, a fact that leads gradually to their dilution.136 Thus, the 
‘challenge’ is to bring ‘positive’ obligations ‘under a manageable level’137 through, say, 
predictability and certainty.138 Bearing these concerns in mind, the author in the next 
section discusses another philosophy relevant to security, ‘communitarianism’. This theory 
lends greater support to the author’s conceptual foundation for a group right to security 
than, say, Hobbesian ‘absolutism’, because, whilst it arguably draws on a model of security 
with, say, ‘statist’ traditions, at least since ‘9/11’, it does offer concessions to strands of 
liberalism, such as Teson’s ‘liberalism 1’. 
                                                 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Dimitros Xenos, op.cit., at p.4. 
136 Ibid., at p.204. 
137 Ibid., at p.5. 
138 Ibid. 
50 
 
Communitarianism 
 
The author’s theoretical justification for a right to security is a compromise between the 
social contract theories of ‘state absolutism’ on the one hand and liberalism on the other. 
Some liberals are maybe right to be concerned about an overly expansive interpretation of 
security, especially through the use of ‘positive’ obligations, in that there is then much less 
emphasis on rights restraining the power of the state. And other liberal approaches to 
human rights and security, such as those presented by, say, Ignatieff, are much closer to the 
author’s conception of a right to security. However, liberals arguably pay too much 
attention to individualism and too little attention to community. The author’s right to 
security is borne out of ‘positive’ obligations imposed on a state by virtue of, say, Article 2 of 
the ECHR, the right to life, which would attach greater weight to the right of a ‘group’ or 
‘community’ to security than the liberties of individuals. For the greater good of public 
protection, the author wishes to import notions of a ‘collective’ or ‘human’ security down to 
a much lower level. Thus, this ‘overarching’ thesis aims to ground the foundations for a 
‘semi-collective’ right to security in, say, ‘communitarian’ criticisms of liberalism. That is, 
whilst the preservation of some rights such as freedom from torture are still very important, 
rights in general need to be balanced much less in favour of the individual and balanced 
much more in favour of the community. 
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Modern-day communitarianism, such as that proposed by Alasdair MacIntyre,139 Michael J 
Sandel,140 and Michael Walzer,141 began in the form of a critical reaction to John Rawls’ A 
Theory of Justice. Sandel states, for example: 
 
‘At issue is…whether the principles of justice that govern the basic structure of 
society can be neutral with respect to the competing moral and religious convictions 
its citizens espouse…One way of linking justice with the conceptions of the good 
holds that principles of justice derive their moral force from values commonly 
espoused or widely shared in a particular community or tradition. This way of linking 
justice and the good is communitarian in the sense that the values of the community 
define what counts as just or unjust.’142 
 
Thus, the main theme of communitarianism is that there are common formulations of the 
public good rather than leaving it to be determined by each individual; the state cannot 
remain neutral on the issue. And in further rejecting, say, Rawls’s ‘veil of ignorance’ 
hypothetical exercise, communitarians do not believe that individuals are born free and 
unencumbered, wholly autonomous agents:143 they are ‘bundles of particularistic 
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attributes’.144 We are bearers of a particular social identity; we are someone’s son or 
daughter, someone’s cousin or uncle; we are citizens of this or that city, members of this or 
that guild or profession; we belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation. We inherit from the 
past of our family, our city, our tribe, our nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful 
expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of our lives, our starting point.145 
More recent theories of communitarianism are those advanced by, say, Amitai Etzioni146 
and Mary Ann Glendon.147 For them, an important communitarian principle, which is 
particularly relevant to this thesis, is redressing the balance between liberalism’s emphasis 
on the rights of the individual and social responsibilities.148 
 
1. Redressing the balance between rights and responsibilities 
 
Communitarians such as Etzioni and Glendon believe in less individualism and more social 
responsibility; less autonomy and more community. Unless society begins to redress the 
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balance between rights of the individual and a person’s obligations to the community, these 
communitarians believe society is, and will continue to be, self-centred and driven by self-
interests.149 No society can survive if people only want rights and are unwilling to assume 
responsibilities:150 ‘To take and not to give, to draw on the commonwealth, but to refuse to 
contribute, people demanding that the government, and above all taxes, be curtailed, while 
still seeking more government services from education to public health, from housing to 
protection from crime.’151 
 
The liberal emphasis on rights of the individual – and neglect of responsibilities – inherits 
much from Locke, but the latter inherits much from the American tradition of human rights 
and the US Declaration of Independence of the United States in particular. Rights Talk: The 
Impoverishment of Political Discourse by Mary Ann Glendon is especially important in this 
regard. Glendon titles the first chapter of her book ‘The Land of Rights’ in reference to 
America.152 She says that, even in 1789, which was the date of the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the Citizen, ‘the parting of ways’ was already evident: the French 
Declaration, in contrast to the Declaration of Independence, emphasised that individuals 
have duties as well as rights: ‘American rights talk is set apart by the way the rights…tend to 
be presented as absolute, individual, and independent of any necessary relation to 
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responsibilities.’153 Glendon refers to Article 29(1) of the UDHR, for example, which states: 
‘Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his 
personality is possible.’154  
 
In chapter two of her book, which is titled, ‘The Illusion of Absoluteness’, Glendon critiques 
the seeming absolute nature of American rights talk.155 In part she blames this on the US 
Constitution and especially the First and Second Amendments: free speech and the right to 
bear arms respectively.156 Echoing a classic criticism of liberalism by, say, Bentham, Glendon 
says that no one can be an absolutist for all constitutionally guaranteed rights, because 
taking any one of them as far as it can go soon brings it into conflict with others.157 And she 
believes that this ‘rhetoric of absoluteness’ has the ill effect that it tends to downgrade 
rights into the mere expression of unbounded desires and wants: ‘Excessively strong 
formulations express our most infantile instincts rather than our potential to be reasonable 
men and women. A country where we can do ‘anything we want’ is not a republic of free 
people attempting to order their lives together.’158 
                                                 
153 Ibid., at p.12. Chapter four of Glendon’s book, ‘The Missing Language of Responsibility’ 
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It is important to note, however, that the communitarian philosophy of, say, Etzioni is not 
anti-rights. He says that because ‘no society is ever perfectly balanced’, communitarians 
seek to discern the direction a society is leaning at any one point in history and cast their 
weight on the other side. Thus, in China and the former Soviet Union, a communitarian 
would fight for expanding and enshrining individual rights. In the United States 
communitarians feel that social responsibilities particularly need shoring up.159 So 
responsibilities do not replace rights or vice versa; they require one another.160 What then 
would be a communitarian response to the restrictions on individual freedoms presented in 
the author’s published works? 
 
2. Communitarianism and human rights 
 
In After Virtue, for example, MacIntyre articulated a strong anti-liberal approach to 
communitarianism. Whilst he conceded that there may be practices which simply are evil 
such as torture, he claimed natural or human rights were ‘fictions’. Rights presuppose ‘the 
existence of a socially established set of rules…[in] particular historical periods under 
particular social circumstances’ (articulating similar criticisms of, say, Lockean liberalism by 
Bentham?).161 Interestingly, MacIntyre in a later edition of After Virtue, the third edition, 
expressed unease with the labelling of him as ‘communitarian’. He saw no value in 
community as such – ‘many types of community are nastily oppressive’ – and the values of 
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community, as understood by spokespersons of contemporary communitarianism, such as 
Amitai Etzioni, were compatible with and supportive of the values of the liberalism that he 
had rejected.162 
 
As MacIntyre suggests Etzioni arguably proposes a ‘liberal’ approach to communitarianism. 
In reference to, say, freedom of speech, which he is loath to infringe, Etzioni states that the 
First Amendment of the US Constitution is as dear to communitarians as it is to libertarians 
and many other Americans. Suggestions that it should be curbed to bar verbal expressions 
of racism, sexism, and other slurs ‘seem to us to endanger the essence of the First 
Amendment’.163 (But Etzioni does say that the victims of such abuse should not be ignored. 
To this end, he suggests education programmes as a way of encouraging ‘responsible’ 
speech rather than the coercive nature of the law.164) In Spheres of Justice, Walzer 
articulated a more moderate communitarian vision, too. He developed his notion of 
community against a background of rights, asserting that individuals had the right to ‘life 
and liberty,’ and other rights ‘beyond those’.165 
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In summary, communitarians charge contemporary liberal philosophers such as Rawls with 
an excessive focus on individual rights and with neglect of obligations to the community and 
to shared purposes. While contemporary liberal philosophers evince a measure of 
commitment to a moderate vision of community – Rawls became less individualistic and 
more sympathetic to communitarianism in his later work Political Liberalism,166 for example 
– they contend that communitarians provide an insufficient basis for individual rights. 
Communitarians, in turn indirectly acknowledge the need to ensure these rights in order to 
avoid ‘collectivism’.167 On the continuum, therefore, between freedom and community, 
communitarians – especially the more liberally minded ones such as Etzioni and Walzer – 
are more inclined to draw the line towards the latter. The theme of the author’s published 
works, with a greater focus on the community rather than on either the private sector or 
the government, but not an erosion of every human right of the individual, is therefore 
suggesting – at least implicitly – a ‘liberal communitarian’, right to security. But what have 
‘liberal communitarians’ like Etzioni said about security in particular? This issue will be 
explored in the next section. 
 
3. Liberal communitarianism and security  
 
Amitai Etzioni seems to have become much less liberal post ‘9/11’, such that he seemingly 
shares the author’s belief that human rights are predicated on security. For Etzioni the right 
to security is more fundamental than any others, so much so, ‘it ought to be treated as a 
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class unto itself’.168 The main reason that the right to security takes precedence over all 
others is that all the others are contingent on the protection of life – whereas the right to 
security is not similarly contingent on any other rights.169 He declares: ‘It sounds simplistic 
to state that dead people cannot exercise their rights, whereas those who are living securely 
at least have the possibility of exercising more rights in the future. However, it is still an 
essential truth: when and where the right to security is violated, all other rights are violated 
as well.’170 
 
So for liberal communitarians like Etzioni security is a precondition for the enjoyment of 
rights and freedoms – a ‘basic’ right from which all others rights flow.171 And in reference to, 
say, security measures post ‘9/11’, he believes that nations have not lost their liberty as a 
result of a small accumulation of increased safety measures: they did so when they failed to 
respond to urgent public needs.172 He proclaims: ‘True patriots…realize that one must 
protect the nation from all enemies and the essence of what it means to be patriotic is to 
protect our Constitution and its Bill of Rights with all our might.’173 
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170 Ibid. 
171 That said, it may be possible to exercise rights in conditions of insecurity – see, for 
example, Jeremey Waldron, ‘Security as a Basic Right (after 9/11)’ in Torture, Terror and 
Trade-Offs: Philosophy for the White House. Oxford University Press, 2010, at p.177. 
172 Amitai Etzioni, ‘Introduction: Rights and Responsibilities, Post ‘9/11’ in Amitai Etzioni and 
Jason H. Marsh (eds), Rights vs. Public Safety After ‘9/11’: America in the Age of Terrorism. 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003, ix-xviii, at p.xii. 
173 Amitai Etzioni, How Patriotic is the Patriot Act? Freedom Versus Security in the Age of 
Terrorism. Routledge, 2005, at p.1. 
59 
 
But Etzioni is not a Hobbesian ‘absolutist’: he believes that ‘to seek full-fledged security, to 
obviate all threats, to end fear, puts us on the slippery slope at the bottom of which is a 
police state’.174 To this end, he says that individuals should share the commitment to find a 
middle course between those who are committed to shore up liberties but who are blind to 
the needs of public safety, and those who in the name of security never met a right that 
they were unwilling to curtail to give authorities a free hand.175 Like many liberals, at least 
since ‘9/11’, such as Teson who attempts to plot a course between a ‘conservative 
conception of security’ and ‘liberalism 2’, Etzioni has become much less liberal but still does 
not subscribe to an unfettered global fight against terrorism: to reduce the danger of 
slipping down the slope, it is important to ‘draw additional moral and legal notches along 
the way’.176 Drawing parallels with, say, the ‘lesser-evils’ approach of Ignatieff, Etzioni says 
that before setting foot on the slope, we must mark how far we are willing to go, in order to 
avoid slipping to a place one ought not to go.177 
 
In a separate piece, Etzioni elaborates further on what he thinks is or is not acceptable. 
Seemingly sharing this author’s belief, in his published works, in the significant curtailment 
of the rights of terror suspects for reasons of security, Etzioni criticises those (such as 
Dworkin?) who urge that suspected terrorists are to be treated like, say, other criminals; 
assumed innocent until proven guilty; tried in civil courts according to similar procedures 
employed in the trying of other criminals; afforded several layers of appeals if found guilty; 
and incarcerated and released once they have served their terms. Importantly, he suggests 
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that such an approach accords ‘terrorists more rights than they are entitled to, and unduly 
and significantly increases risks to the security of innocent citizens’.178 That said, Etzioni 
does believe that there are limits to the state’s infringement of the rights of terrorists: he 
states that even terrorists ‘should indisputably be guaranteed some basic rights’. For 
example, they should be captured rather than killed; they should not be tortured or turned 
over to other states that are likely to kill or torture them. Rather than holding them 
indefinitely, they should be subject to a defined period of administrative detention, which 
could be extended through legally established channels if necessary.179 
 
The author’s liberal communitarian right to security  
 
The theoretical base for the author’s conception of a right to security is ‘liberal 
communitarianism’. Communitarians are critical of, say, liberalism’s overemphasis on rights 
but do not wish to qualify every right of the individual such as freedom from torture in the 
furtherance of security. But ‘liberal communitarians’ like Etzioni are still prepared to ‘trade’ 
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many other rights of the individual for the greater good – an approach pervading many of 
this author’s published works.  
 
That said, it is important not to ignore the concerns about a right to security, as previously 
expressed by, say, Lazarus: as the right stands, it is arguably vague, ambiguous and too 
broad to be legally workable. Indeed, even communitarians possibly have their doubts. It 
will be recalled that ‘liberal communitarians’ wish to redress liberalism’s neglect of 
responsibilities, but whilst Etzioni, Glendon etc are not anti-rights, they do propose a 
moratorium on the manufacture of new rights: 
 
‘Once, rights were very solemn moral/legal claims, ensconced in the Constitution 
and treated with much reverence…We need to remind one another that each newly 
minted right generates a claim on someone [my italics]. Unless we want to generate 
a universal backlash against rights, we need to curb rights inflation and protect the 
currency of rights from being further devalued.’180 
 
If the author were to conceive his ‘positive’ right to security as one in express terms, then a 
model for such a right could be Article 23(1) of ACHPR. And there is s.12(1) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which is ‘the most extensively defined 
autonomous, express and justiciable right to security in any constitutional document around 
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the world’.181 This states that everyone has the right to be free from all forms of violence 
from either public or private sources. But in justifying liberal communitarianism in the 
conception of his group right to security, ideologically, the author is perhaps constrained 
from advocating the creation of a new right. To this end, in calling for a more expansive 
interpretation of the existing ‘positive’ obligations of the ECHR, he is therefore developing a 
right to security. In the next sub-section the author discusses the ‘reach’ of his right, as 
propounded in his published works attached to this thesis. 
 
1. The ‘reach’ of the author’s right to security in his published works 
 
In two of the author’s works, he applies the right to life to the shooting of a suspected 
suicide bomber, Jean Charles de Menezes, at Stockwell train station in London in July 2005. 
But in the first piece, because of word constraints, the author examines only the ‘express’ 
‘positive’ duty of the state to protect life, as per Article 2(1) of the ECHR (as well as the 
‘negative’ right not to be unlawfully killed, as per Article 2(2)).182 The second article in the 
de Menezes study continues the theme of the first, in that the shooting is assessed on the 
grounds of its human rights’ compatibility, but from the perspective of another element of 
the ‘positive’ obligation of Article 2(1): the procedural duty imposed on state authorities to 
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investigate death.183 In a third case study, unrelated to the author’s analyses of the de 
Menezes shooting, an examination of the ‘positive’ obligation imposed on the state to 
protect life is also undertaken. However, this time the author employs a ‘right to security’ to 
support the then control order scheme, as per the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005; a 
scheme designed to disrupt the activities of terror suspects.184 And in a fourth, separate 
article the author employs a ‘right to security’ to question support for a routinely armed 
police in mainland Britain, which, if the police had been armed, might have saved significant 
loss of life from, say, the shooting spree of Derrick Bird in Cumbria in 2010.185 
 
In two other articles, the author examines Article 3 of the ECHR, the freedom from torture 
and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment, in supporting the possible torture 
of terror suspects. To go on and construct a possible argument justifying ill-treatment 
against a terror detainee on the basis of, say, the state’s ‘positive’ duty to prevent violations 
of Article 3 by non-state actors, for reasons of security, which the author attempts to do in 
the second piece,186 he questions in the first article whether freedom from torture can in 
fact be categorised as absolute.187  
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In another of his articles illustrating the utility of ‘positive’ obligations to situations 
threatening security, but is excluded from this PhD study because of word length, the 
author examines Article 4 of the ECHR, the freedom from slavery, servitude, forced or 
compulsory labour. There, he assesses the UK’s statutory compliance with its ‘positive’ 
obligations in criminalising trafficking in human beings (THB) – a contemporary form of 
slavery – to prevent violations of rights by third parties such as criminals.188 Although this 
PhD study mainly concentrates on threats to public safety from terrorism, THB poses a 
serious risk to security, too: it is thought to be the world’s fastest growing criminal activity 
involving a global enterprise worth in the region of US$32 billion, of which 2.4 million 
people are thought to be its victims.189 
 
The author has written a second article on the UK’s ‘positive’ obligations under Article 4, but 
this time he largely concentrates on the state’s duties to protect victims of human 
trafficking.190 The fact that this piece will not be in print at the time of submission of this 
PhD excludes it from this study, too, but of course it represents a further contribution to the 
author’s published works on ‘positive’ obligations and a ‘right to security’. Indeed, this 
second piece assessing Article 4 is particularly informative in respect of a discussion of 
‘positive’ obligations, in that it explores the ‘reach’ of these duties imposed on states much 
more so than the works attached to this study. In 2002, for example, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights published the Recommended Principles and Guidelines 
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on Human Rights and Human Trafficking. Its core principles emphasise: ‘preventing 
trafficking’ (principles 4-6); ‘protection and assistance’ to victims (principles 7-11); and 
‘criminalization, punishment and redress’ (principles 12-17). Internationally, therefore, 
human rights principles informing states’ anti-trafficking measures should ‘prevent’ and 
‘protect’, as well as ‘criminalize’, or ‘prosecute’, to give the principles their short-title of the 
‘3Ps’. Often ‘positive’ state obligations under human rights law such as those attached to 
freedom from slavery are couched in terms of ‘prevent’, but fulfilling this duty can be 
achieved in several ways. In reference to, say, the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially W omen and Children (‘UN 
Protocol’), which the UK ratified in 2006, Article 5 obliges state parties to criminalise human 
trafficking. A state’s emphasis upon the ‘prosecution’ of those who engage in human 
trafficking can therefore contribute to ‘preventing’ (or at the very least reducing) future 
harm against a person because of, say, its deterrent effect. ‘Prevention’ can also be 
achieved through ‘protection’: the UN Protocol obliges state parties to provide assistance to 
and protection of victims of trafficking, as per Article 6; and Article 7 encourages states to 
allow victims of trafficking to remain in their country of transit, temporarily or permanently, 
if they so wish. Thus, by encouraging victims to come forward by offering assistance, and in 
some cases permitting them to stay, Articles 6 and 7 can ‘prevent’ the continuance of the 
harm. Article 9 of the UN Protocol, which is expressly referred to as ‘Prevention of 
trafficking in persons’, requires state parties to establish comprehensive policies, 
programmes and other measures: (a) to prevent and combat trafficking in persons; and (b) 
revictimization.  
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The author in his published works has illustrated the significant ‘reach’ of a right to security, 
by reference to the ‘positive’ nature of several human rights: the right to life, freedom from 
torture and freedom from slavery. But Zedner, Lazarus, Hein van Kempen and others are 
concerned about an overly wide interpretation of a right to security, such that they wish to 
restrain its exercise. Many of these concerns are grounded in traditional liberal ideas of the 
‘Rule of Law’ such as ‘legal certainty’.191 But even ‘liberal communitarians’ such as Etzioni 
are concerned about an expansion of rights, in that there is a risk of devaluing existing rights 
(so the author is developing an existing right rather than suggesting the creation of a new 
one). In the next sub-section the author therefore discusses the limits to his right to 
security, as propounded in the pieces attached to this thesis.  
 
2. The limits to the author’s right to security in his published works 
 
Before the author discusses the limits to his right to security, as propounded in the attached 
works, the question of who will be able to enforce such a group right will be addressed, as 
this issue is largely absent from his existing publications. The author is expanding the 
interpretation of, say, the right to life beyond its traditional ‘positive’, protection of a 
specific individual, or individuals, but in so doing, he is relying on communitarian ideals as a 
theoretical model for doing so. If the author’s right to security is to be justiciable,192 it is 
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logical, perhaps, to draw on this theory’s definition of ‘community’ to explain the ‘standing’ 
of those who can claim such a right. Etzioni, for example, describes ‘community’ as ‘kin, 
friends, neighbours, and other community members’,193 so the provenance of the group for 
the purposes of state protection would be relatively small. Thus, this author is not 
articulating an all embracing duty imposed on the authorities to protect everyone; there 
would have to be a ‘communitarian’ nexus between the individual making the claim and the 
threat that the state had allegedly failed to avert. 
 
Continuing the limits of his right to security, in an article discussing human rights in general, 
which is also not included in this study for reasons of word length, but is still a published 
piece by the author, the author examines the effect on human rights in the UK since the 
introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998, incorporating the ECHR into domestic law.194 
Traditional principles of judicial review dictate that the courts are concerned with assessing 
only the lawfulness of administrative decision-making rather than its merits. That said, the 
author in this piece finds that the orthodox principles of judicial review no longer apply: the 
courts engage in a legitimate review of merits when assessing suspected breaches of the 
ECHR. Nevertheless, there is an absolute bar to judicial intervention: the executive reserves 
the right not to have their judgments substituted by the courts.195 In terms of enforcement, 
therefore, the author’s right to security should not entail the courts in a substitution of 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘positive obligations’ through existing human rights that are legally enforceable does signify 
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194 Ian Turner, ‘Irrationality, the Human Rights Act and the Limits of Merits-Review’ (2009) 
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68 
 
judgment. That is, the executive branch of the state should be accorded some measure of 
discretion in how it chooses to protect human security. 
 
In further ‘mapping’ the author’s right to security, it is important to look at the specific 
human right of the individual being curtailed for reasons of public protection, in that some 
rights are more important than others. First, there are those freedoms like Article 3 of the 
ECHR, the prohibition on torture, which in law, are ‘absolute’ and can never be infringed. 
(They are also ‘non-derogable’ in times of war or public emergency, as per, say, Article 15(2) 
of the ECHR.) In two of his published works it will be recalled that the author explores a 
relaxation of the absolute ban on the use of torture against terror suspects. In his first 
torture article he concludes that the freedom is indeed absolute, thus making an argument 
justifying the use of ill-treatment much more difficult.196 Interestingly, there he questions if 
the right is not to be abrogated by the conduct of terrorists, how is the freedom squared 
with, for example, Article 17 of the ECHR, the prohibition of abuse of rights?197 Article 17 
states:  
 
‘Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to 
a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.’  
                                                 
196 Ian Turner, op.cit. (2011b), at p.419. 
197 Ibid., at pp.429-430. 
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In that piece the author finds that the application of Article 17 is limited, as per, say, the 
ruling of the ECtHR in Lawless v. Ireland,198 in that it is restricted to situations where rights 
are claimed to destroy the liberties of others. There, the author uses the example of 
extremists claiming a right to freedom of expression, when calling for the death of those 
who have offended the Muslim prophet Mohammed (Article 17 can also be used as basis for 
justifying, say, the censorship, and even criminalisation, of ‘hate speech’ such as the denial 
of the ‘Holocaust’). But is not the essence of Article 17 ‘responsibility’? – a key criterion of 
communitarianism. Perhaps, therefore, rather than calling for a more expansive 
interpretation of ‘positive’ obligations to support a right to security, the author should do so 
in reference to Article 17, or even as a supplement to this? For reasons of word length such 
questions will not be explored here but in future works by the author. (That said, it has 
already been stated earlier in this piece that some liberals believe that the very posing of 
this question – that is, suspects who seek to destroy democracy should not be able to rely 
on its values for their own protection – already assumes guilt.199) 
 
Not to be deterred about his conclusions in the first torture work, the author explores in the 
second piece another case for a relaxation of the ban for the purposes of security, but from 
a different perspective: protecting the ‘positive’ rights of, say, terror victims, especially 
children, from acts of harm?200 However, for several reasons, such arguments are 
rejected.201 Indeed, this overarching thesis can provide a theoretical edge to some of the 
                                                 
198 (1960) 1 EHRR 1. 
199 David Luban, ‘Eight Fallacies About Liberty and Security’ in Richard Ashby Wilson (ed), 
op.cit., at p.252. 
200 Ian Turner, op.cit. (2012). 
201 Ibid., at pp.768-771. 
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author’s findings in these torture pieces that a limit to his right to security should exclude 
the ill-treatment of a terror suspect. Infringements of Article 3 were justified by utilitarian 
philosophy, at least implicitly rather than explicitly, because in extreme cases they provide 
the greatest security for the greatest number. In fact some utilitarians oppose torture on 
practical grounds.202 They argue it seldom works, since the information gained is often 
unreliable.203 Pain is inflicted, but the community is not made safer: there is no increase in 
the collective utility.204 Or they worry that if states engage in torture, they will become less 
secure; their soldiers abroad will face harsher treatment if taken prisoner, for example.205 
Thus, the author in his published works on torture was maybe not subscribing to the 
traditional liberal approach that the freedom was non-negotiable, it being a natural right: 
his rejection of the practice was probably premised more on traditional utilitarian grounds, 
that is, merely after a cost/benefit analysis, he concluded that the practice does more harm 
than good.  
 
But in writing this thesis, the author is not so sure now if the limits to his group right to 
security, which include respecting freedom from torture, are grounded in utilitarian 
balancing or that some rights are so fundamental that they should be protected from 
majoritarian laws.206 That said, when discussing ‘balance’, Etzioni believes that there a small 
number of ‘major moral values’ that speak to us directly, that we find compelling. He says 
that people are born with a moral sense that yields strong judgments about various 
                                                 
202 Michael J Sandel, op.cit. (2010), at pp.38-39. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Or is, say, torture simply wrong, to adopt a Kantian perspective? – see footnote 68. 
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behaviours.207 Thus, whilst this author is still unsure whether he would balance torture, for 
example, in the pursuit of security, he has strong beliefs that freedom from the death 
penalty should always be excluded – whatever the cost. Some may argue that some crimes, 
such as those of international concern such as genocide, being so heinous, should at least 
warrant capital punishment being available to a court for consideration, but in the author’s 
‘defence’ even the death penalty is excluded from the punishment powers of the ICC, as per 
Article 77 of the ‘Rome Statute’. 
 
The right to life is ranked with freedom from torture in terms of its importance. In the 
author’s first article examining the killing of Jean Charles de Menezes by police firearms 
officers in 2005, it will be recalled that he assesses the ‘positive’ duty to protect life (and the 
‘negative’ right not be unlawfully killed).208 In conclusion, accounting for the many features 
of Article 2, ‘positive’ and ‘negative’, the author finds that the balance falls in favour of the 
state, that is, de Menezes was not unlawfully killed. Nonetheless, if in the event that the 
killing is later held to contravene Article 2, he does believe, therefore, that the ‘positive’ 
obligation is weighted too heavily on the side of the individual whose life has been deprived 
rather than the community’s right to be protected from terrorism, especially suicide 
violence where the risks to life are that far greater. But in calling for a standard more 
beneficial to the public interest, the author neither calls for a unilateral relaxation of existing 
terror laws in favour of states authorities nor an extension to them.209 
                                                 
207 Amitai Etzioni, op.cit. (2014), at p.251. 
208 Ian Turner, op.cit. (2008). 
209 Ibid., at pp.26-27. 
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Continuing the limits of a group right to security, the author does so again in the second 
article assessing the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes, but from the perspective of the 
state’s investigative obligation.210 There, he finds that the subsequent inquiries into the 
shooting were lawful. Nonetheless, for the purposes of protecting life, and the continued 
accountability of state agents, especially those killings for which the police are directly 
responsible, he argues that this element of the ‘positive’ obligation – the procedural duty – 
should not be relaxed in the fight against terrorism. Otherwise the ‘positive’ duty to protect 
life, which is the basis for legitimising a lesser need for lethal force in the author’s first 
article, lacks sufficient safeguards for the person whose life has been deprived; and arguably 
puts the general public at greater risk.211 
 
The author sets further limits to a group right to security when he questions support for 
armed police in mainland Britain.212 In this article he concludes that the Cumbria police did 
not fail in their duty to protect life in granting a firearms license to, say, Derrick Bird. In 
doing so, however, he limits his right to security by doubting the need for all police officers 
to be routinely armed (recent firearms operations, for example, such as those involving the 
killings of Azelle Rodney in 2005, Jean Charles de Menezes in 2005, Mark Saunders in 2006 
and Mark Duggan in 2011, do not necessarily inspire public confidence). Nevertheless, for 
reasons of greater public protection, the author does suggest reform of the firearms 
licensing scheme and the wider use of ‘less-lethal weapons’ by the police such as TASERs. 
 
                                                 
210 Ian Turner, op.cit. (2009a). 
211 Ibid., at p.19. 
212 Ian Turner, op.cit. (2015a). 
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Moving away from basic liberties such as freedom from torture and the right to life in the 
‘hierarchy’ of human rights, one ‘finds’ special rights – that is, those freedoms that can be 
infringed but only in limited circumstances – such as Article 5 of the ECHR, the right to 
liberty, and Article 6 of the ECHR, the right to a fair trial. Because these rights are seemingly 
less important than those discussed above, the author in his published works inevitably 
adopts a more expansive interpretation of ‘positive’ obligations justifying their 
infringement. He does so, for example, in supporting the then control order scheme to 
disrupt the activities of terror suspects.213 The scheme extended the reach of state 
interference – orders were imposed on individuals where there was only a reasonable 
suspicion – and was significantly intrusive of human rights: Article 5 of the ECHR, the right to 
liberty; Article 6 of the ECHR, the right to a fair trial; and Article 8 of the ECHR, the right to 
respect for private life, family, home and correspondence. The author makes out a case for 
supporting control orders on the basis of the existing ‘positive’ duty imposed on the state to 
protect life as per Article 2(1) of the ECHR.214 
                                                 
213 Ian Turner, op.cit. (2011a). 
214 Ibid., at pp.350-354. Incidentally, control orders were replaced by Terrorism Prevention 
and Investigation Measures (TPIMs) in s.1 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures Act 2011. This statute relaxed the controls on a suspect, as well as raising the 
standard of proof for their imposition from ‘reasonable suspicion’ to ‘reasonable belief’, as 
per s.3. Nevertheless, a former independent reviewer of anti-terrorism legislation in the UK, 
Lord Carlille, called for the reintroduction of control orders, to increase security. This was 
because of, say, the threat to the UK from Britons returning to the country, after having 
travelled abroad to train and fight with international terror groups such as Islamic State 
(ISIL) in Syria and Iraq – Matthew Holehouse, ‘Isil: Call to Bring back Blair’s Control Orders 
for Terror Suspects’ The Telegraph. 22nd August 2014 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/11050330/Isil-call-to-bring-
back-Blairs-Control-Orders-for-terror-suspects.html (Accessed 24th March 2015). Thus, 
whilst the new Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 has raised the standard of proof of 
a TPIM still further – to the civil standard of proof, ‘a balance of probabilities’, as per s.20 – 
it has placed greater restrictions on the freedoms of the individual, as per ss.16-19 – see, for 
example: Ian Turner, ‘CTSA 2015 and the Risk of Being Drawn Into Terrorism’ Lexis Nexis 
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Conclusion 
 
Post 9/11 the threat to the UK and its allies from Islamist terror groups such as Al-Qaeda has 
continued: there was the ‘Ricin case’, a plot to spread deadly ricin across London, in 2003; 
the train bombings in Madrid in 2004 and the 7/7 attacks in London in 2005, as well as the 
failed suicide bombings a couple of weeks later. There was also the ‘Airline Bomb Plot’, a 
plot to detonate homemade explosives on airliners mid-flight over the Atlantic Ocean, in 
2006, and the discovery of a bomb in a computer printer on a plane bound for the United 
States at East Midlands airport in 2007. Whilst the threat to security from Al-Qaeda in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan has decreased, with, say, the killing of Osama Bin Laden by 
American Special Forces in May 2011, as well as the threat from Al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula, with, say, the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki by an American drone strike in Yemen in 
September 2011, acts of ‘super-terrorism’ by other Islamist groups have not abated. In 
particular, there has been the spectacular rise of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIL), over 
the last few years with, say, its beheadings of Westerners, such as James Foley, videos of 
which were posted on the internet. (The murder of James Foley caused the UK government 
to increase its terror threat level from ‘substantial’ to ‘severe’ in August 2014.) More 
recently, ISIL has committed terror atrocities in mainland Europe: the shootings at the 
Jewish Museum in Brussels in 2014 and the offices of the satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, 
                                                                                                                                                        
News. 1st April 2015 
https://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/lexispsl/immigration/document/412012/5FN3-3BP1-DYW7-
W54B-00000-00/CTSA-2015-and-the-risk-of-being-drawn-into-terrorism- (legislative 
commentary) (last accessed 14th April 2015). So with TPIMs the state could be said to be 
attaching less weight to the rights of the individual because of public safety, as the author 
previously supported. 
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in Paris in January 2015, as well as its massacres in the same city, Paris, primarily at the 
Bataclan Theatre, where 89 people were killed, in November 2015. These outrages serve 
only to remind states that they need to remain strong and vigilant if they are to be 
successful in preventing, or at least reducing, Islamist terrorism. Contributing to the debate 
about states’ need to provide effective protection to their citizens from, say, ISIL, this 
overarching thesis has advocated a human right to security – but not the furtherance of the 
traditional liberal, ‘negative’, right to security of the individual from the state: a collective, 
‘positive’ right of security from threats to public safety from non-state actors such as 
suspected terrorists. The foundations for such a human right are the ‘positive’ obligations 
imposed on states to, say, protect life, as per Article 2(1) of the ECHR, and prevent injury, as 
per Article 3 of the ECHR. 
 
The social contract theories of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke emphasise the state’s 
responsibility to provide security so serve – at least initially – as theoretical models for the 
author’s conception of his ‘positive’ right to security. The author finds the lure of Hobbesian 
‘absolutism’ particularly seductive, especially as his attached published works suggest he is 
prepared to make substantial in-roads into the rights of the individual for the peace and 
order that would inevitably follow. However, in acquiring significant powers of security, 
Locke, for example, believed that the Hobbesian sovereign could itself pose a threat to 
security. The totalitarian regimes of, say, Stalin and Hitler were ‘absolutist’ ones seemingly 
supported by the writings of Hobbes, in that significant curtailments of human rights were 
justified on the basis of security – but these states were themselves a significant threat to 
security, especially to Jews, Roma, political opponents, gay and lesbian men and women, 
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those with disabilities etc. However, this is to do Hobbes an injustice: these states had in 
fact delegitimised themselves in the eyes of Hobbesian philosophy as the covenant upon 
which these individuals had qualified their rights in exchange for protection was 
spectacularly broken. Thus, a right of rebellion to institute a new sovereign was permitted. 
 
That said, Locke believed that to legitimise a right of rebellion only when the state had gone 
too far – in enslaving its subjects, for example – was too late. Moreover, in conceiving the 
Hobbesian model as the basis for public protection of democracy, the state seemingly 
undermines the very ideals it is seeking to preserve; the degree of ‘trade-off’ between rights 
and security required to fulfil the Hobbesian sovereign can so easily become merely a 
question of ‘your rights for my security’; and is there actual evidence that substantial gains 
in state power in the last 15 years or so, as the terror threat has continued, have actually 
made nations more safe? So liberal concerns about significant erosions of individual 
freedoms post 9/11 should not be ignored (perhaps, therefore, to work through this 
apparent ‘impasse’, the author should be advocating a freedom from insecurity, to reflect 
traditional, liberal sensibilities, rather than a right to security, but this would still require 
intervention by the state for the right to be fulfilled, it being ostensibly a ‘positive’ right in 
the sense of Article 6 of the ECHR, the right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial 
court or tribunal). Nevertheless, some liberals do recognise substantial limitations on 
individual freedoms for the greater good. Teson, for example, attacks those strands of 
liberalism which are unprepared to accept a balance between rights and security – Dworkin 
and others? – in that these liberals seemingly overlook threats that undermine the very 
values that they hold so dear. Indeed, some liberals such as Ignatieff go much further; in 
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advocating ‘a lesser evils’ approach, Ignatieff justifies significant curtailments of individual 
freedom on the basis that terrorism is the ‘greater evil’. 
 
Plotting a course through these models of state absolutism and liberalism one ‘finds’ 
communitarianism. In this ‘overarching’ PhD thesis, therefore, the author is advocating a 
‘positive’ right to security grounded in the ideals of ‘communitarianism’. In particular, 
communitarians reject the Rawlsian, liberal ‘veil of ignorance’ exercise that individuals are 
born-free and wholly unencumbered agents: they are bearers of a particular social identity; 
they are someone’s son or daughter, someone’s cousin or uncle; they are citizens of this or 
that city, members of this or that guild or profession; they belong to this clan, that tribe, this 
nation etc. 
 
Of communitarian theory, the author is attracted to its more moderate elements reflected 
in the writings of, say, Amitai Etzioni and Mary Ann Glendon. Etzioni and Glendon are critical 
of liberalism’s Lockean traditions of absolute freedoms, in that they attach too much 
emphasis to rights and too little weight to responsibilities (a charge implicit in the critical 
writings of ‘natural’ rights by Bentham). Thus, Etzioni and Glendon call for a moratorium on 
new freedoms. In basing his ‘communitarian’, right to security on an expansive 
interpretation of ‘positive’ duties of the state, the author is therefore not proposing an 
autonomous human right to security, which would suggest the creation of a new right; he is 
developing an existing one. Etzioni and Glendon also believe that too many rights devalue 
the more fundamental and well established ones such as the First Amendment of the US 
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Constitution, the right to free speech, which they are loathe to infringe. In this respect, 
therefore, Etzioni and Glendon could be categorised as ‘liberal communitarians’.  
 
The author’s accompanying published works see his ‘positive’, ‘liberal communitarian’ right 
to security applied to situations which affect public safety; they are a collection of case 
studies illustrating the reach of the freedom. (Indeed, since 9/11, for example, Etzioni has 
emphasised the significance of security as a ‘basic’ right, which very much agrees with this 
author’s published works that human rights are predicated on security, that is, to enjoy 
human rights requires security but not vice versa.) In many of his pieces the author applies 
his right to security to protect life from 1) the threat of suicide bombers 2) those who the 
state suspects are engaged in acts of terrorism but has insufficient evidence to satisfy the 
criminal standard of proof and 3) individuals licensed to possess firearms and/or shotguns 
but who no longer exercise proper control over them. In two other pieces the author applies 
his right to security in assessing a relaxation of the absolute ban on the use of torture 
against terror suspects, on the premise that they may have information which could prevent 
an attack. 
 
To make the author’s ‘positive’, ‘liberal communitarian’ right to security more legally 
workable, however, his published works also suggest limits to its exercise. (Thus, the author 
still sees his right to security as primarily a justiciable one enforceable before the courts.) He 
does not advocate an all embracing duty imposed on the state to protect everyone, 
justifying the broad erosion of individual liberties for the good of preventing terrorism; 
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there would have to be a ‘communitarian’ nexus between the individual making the claim 
and the threat that the state had allegedly failed to avert. And in reviewing the right, the 
judiciary should not substitute their judgment for that of the executive. 
 
Furthermore, whilst the use of torture against a suspect is rejected – not because it is a 
‘natural’ right that should never be traded, even in the liberty/security balancing exercise, 
but because the author sees it as causing more harm than good – the use of the death 
penalty should never be permitted. And the police should not be routinely armed either, 
though there may be a case for their further weaponisation with less lethal options such as 
TASERs. But in situations not involving the absolute rights of, say, a terror suspect, the 
author’s published works suggest that his ‘communitarian’ right to security should be 
accorded much greater weight in the liberty/security trade-off over, say, the rights to liberty 
and fair trial of the individual. Thus, initiatives such as the previous control order scheme to 
prevent terrorism should not engage judicial scrutiny particularly intensively, when 
examining suspected violations of the rights of the individual. 
